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Abstract
We develop a model of multiwinner elections that combines performance-based mea-
sures of the quality of the committee (such as, e.g., Borda scores of the committee members)
with diversity constraints. Specifically, we assume that the candidates have certain attributes
(such as being a male or a female, being junior or senior, etc.) and the goal is to elect a com-
mittee that, on the one hand, has as high a score regarding a given performance measure,
but that, on the other hand, meets certain requirements (e.g., of the form “at least 30% of
the committee members are junior candidates and at least 40% are females”). We analyze
the computational complexity of computing winning committees in this model, obtaining
polynomial-time algorithms (exact and approximate) and NP-hardness results. We focus
on several natural classes of voting rules and diversity constraints.
1 Introduction
We study the problem of computing committees (i.e., sets of candidates) that, on the one hand,
are of high quality (e.g., consist of high-performing individuals) and that, on the other hand, are
diverse (as specified by a set of constraints). The following example shows our problem in more
concrete terms.
Consider an organization that wants to hold a research meeting on some interdisciplinary
topic such as, e.g., “AI and Economics.” The meeting will take place in some secluded loca-
tion and only a certain limited number of researchers can attend. How should the organizers
choose the researchers to invite? If their main criterion were the number of highly influential
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AI/economics papers that each person published, then they would likely end up with a very ho-
mogeneous group of highly-respected AI professors. Thus, while this criterion definitely should
be important, the organizers might put forward additional constraints. For example, they could
require that at least 30% of the attendees are junior researchers, at least 40% are female, at
least a few economists are invited (but only senior ones), the majority of attendees work on
AI, and the attendees come from at least 3 continents and represent at least 10 different coun-
tries.1 In other words, the organizers would still seek researchers with high numbers of strong
publications, but they would give priority to making the seminar more diverse (indeed, junior
researchers or representatives of different subareas of AI can provide new perspectives; it is
also important to understand what people working in economics have to say, but the organizers
would prefer to learn from established researchers and not from junior ones).
The above example shows a number of key features of our committee-selection model. First,
we assume that there is some function that evaluates the committees (we refer to it as the ob-
jective function). In the example it was (implicitly) the number of high-quality papers that the
members of the committee published. In other settings (e.g., if we were shortlisting job candi-
dates) these could be aggregated opinions of a group of voters (the recruitment committee, in
the shortlisting example).
Second, we assume that each prospective committee member (i.e., each researcher in our
example) has a number of attributes, which we call labels. For example, a researcher can be
junior or senior, a male or a female, can work in AI or in economics or in some other area,
etc. Further, the way in which labels are assigned to the candidates may have a structure on
its own. For example, each researcher is either male or female and either junior or senior, but
otherwise these attributes are independent (i.e., any combination of gender and seniority level is
possible). Other labels may be interdependent and may form hierarchical structures (e.g., every
researcher based in Germany is also labeled as representing Europe). Yet other labels may be
completely unstructured; e.g., researchers can specialize in many subareas of AI, irrespective
how (un)related they seem.
Third, we assume that there is a formalism that specifies when a committee is diverse. In
principle, this formalism could be any function that takes a committee and gives an accept/reject
answer. However, in many typical settings it suffices to consider simple constraints that regard
each label separately (e.g., “at least 30% of the researchers are junior” or “the number of male re-
searchers is even”). We focus on such independent constraints, but studying more involved ones,
that regard multiple labels (e.g., “all invited economists must be senior researchers”) would also
be interesting.
Our goal is to find a committee of a given size k that is diverse and has the highest possible
score from the objective function. While similar problems have already been considered (see
the Related Work section), we believe that our paper is the first to systematically study the
problem of selecting a diverse committee, where diversity is evaluated with respect to candidate
attributes. We provide the following main contributions:
1. We formally define the general problem of selecting a diverse committee and we pro-
1For example, the Leibniz-Zentrum fu¨r Informatik that runs Dagstuhl Seminars gives similar suggestions to
event organizers.
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vide its natural restrictions. Specifically, we focus on the case of submodular objective
functions (with the special case of separable functions), candidate labels that are either
layered or laminar,2 and constraints that specify sets of acceptable cardinalities for each
label independently (with the special case of specifying intervals of acceptable values).
2. We study the complexity of finding a diverse committee of a given size, depending on the
type of the objective function, the type of the label structure, and the type of diversity con-
straints. While in most cases we find our problems to be NP-hard (even if we only want
to check if a committee meeting diversity constraints exists; without optimizing the ob-
jective function), we also find practically relevant cases with polynomial-time algorithms
(e.g., our algorithms would suffice for the research-meeting example restricted to the con-
straints regarding the seniority level and gender). We provide approximation algorithms
for some of our NP-hard problems.
3. We study the complexity of recognizing various types of label structures. For example,
given a set of labeled candidates, we ask if their labels have laminar or layered structure.
It turns out that recognizing structures with three independent sets of labels is NP-hard,
whereas recognizing up to two independent sets is polynomial-time computable.
4. Finally, we introduce the concept of price of diversity, which quantifies the “cost” of
introducing diversity constraints subject to the assumed objective function.
Our main results are presented in Table 1.
2 The Model
For i, j ∈ N, we write [i, j] to denote the set {i, i + 1, . . . , j}. We write [i] as an abbreviation
for [1, i]. For a set X , we write 2X to denote the family of all of its subsets. We first present our
model in full generality and then describe the particular instantiations that we focus on in our
analysis.
General Model Let C = {c1, . . . , cm} be a set of candidates and let L be a set of labels
(such as junior, senior, etc.). Each candidate is associated with a subset of these labels through
a labeling function λ : C → 2L. We say that a candidate c has label ℓ if ℓ ∈ λ(c), and we write
Cℓ to denote the set of all candidates that have label ℓ.
A diversity specification is a function that given a committee (i.e., a set of candidates), the
set of labels, and the labeling function provides a yes/no answer specifying if the committee is
diverse. If a committee is diverse with respect to diversity specificationD, then we say that it is
D-diverse.
2If we restricted our example to labels regarding gender and seniority level, we would have 2-layered labels
(because there are two sets of labels, {male, female} and {junior , senior}, and each candidate has one label from
each set. On the other hand, hierarchical labels, such as those regarding countries and continents, are 1-laminar
(see description of the model for more details).
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An objective function f : 2C → R is a function that associates each committee with a score.
We assume that f(∅) = 0 and that the function is monotone (i.e., for each two committees A
and B such that A ⊆ B, it holds that f(A) ≤ f(B)). In other words, an empty committee has
no value and extending a committee cannot hurt it.
Our goal is to find a committee of a given size k that meets the diversity specification and
that has the highest possible score according to the objective function.
Definition 1 (DIVERSE COMMITTEE WINNER DETERMINATION (DCWD)). Given a set of
candidates C, a set of labels L, a labeling function λ, a diversity specification D, a desired
committee size k, and an objective function f , find a committee W ⊆ C with |W | = k that
achieves the maximum value f(W ) among all D-diverse size-k committees.
The set of candidates, the set of labels, and the labeling function are specified explicitly (i.e.,
by listing all the candidates with all their labels). The encoding of the diversity specification
and the objective function depends on a particular case (see discussions below). To consider the
problem’s NP-hardness, we take its decision variant, where instead of asking for a D-diverse
committee with the highest possible value of the objective function we ask if there exists a
D-diverse committee with objective value at least T (where the threshold T is a part of the
input).
We also consider the DIVERSE COMMITTEE FEASIBILITY (DCF) problem, which takes the
same input as the winner determination problem, but where we ask if anyD-diverse committee
of size k exists, irrespective of its objective value. In other words, the feasibility problem is a
special case of the decision variant of the winner determination problem, where we ask about a
D-diverse committee with objective value greater or equal to 0. Thus, if the feasibility problem
is NP-hard, then the analogous winner determination problem is NP-hard as well (and if the
winner determination problem is polynomial-time computable, so is the feasibility problem).
The model, as specified above, is far to general to obtain any sort of meaningful computa-
tional results. Below we specify its restrictions that we study.
Objective Functions An objective function is submodular if for each two committees S and
S ′ such that S ⊆ S ′ ⊆ C and each c ∈ C \ S ′ it holds that f(S ∪ {c}) − f(S) ≥ f(S ′ ∪
{c}) − f(S ′). For two sets of candidates X and S, we write f(X|S) to denote the marginal
contribution of the candidates from X with respect to those in S. Formally, we have f(X|S) =
f(S ∪X)− f(S). Submodular functions are very common and suffice to express many natural
problems. We assume all our objective functions to be submodular.
Example 1. Consider the following voting scenario. Let C = {c1, . . . , cm} be a set of candi-
dates and V = {v1, . . . , vn} a set of voters, where each voter ranks all the candidates from
best to worst. We write posvi(c) to denote the position of candidate c in the ranking of voter
vi (the best candidate is ranked on position 1, the next one on position 2, and so on). The
Borda score associated with position i (among m possible ones) is βm(i) = m − i. Under the
Chamberlin–Courant rule (CC), the score of a committee S is defined by objective function
fCC(S) =
∑n
i=1 βm(min{posvi(c) | c ∈ S}). Intuitively, this function associates each voter
with her representative (the member of the committee that the voter ranks highest) and defines
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the score of the committee as the sum of the Borda scores of the voters’ representatives. It
is well-known that this function is submodular (Lu and Boutilier, 2011). The CC rule outputs
those committees (of a given size k) for which the CC objective function gives the highest value
(and, intuitively, where each voter is represented by a committee member that the voter ranks
highly).
As a special case of submodular functions, we also consider separable functions. A function
is separable if for every candidate c ∈ C there is a weight wc such that the value of a committee
S is given as f(S) =
∑
c∈S wc. While separable functions are very restrictive, they are also very
natural.
Example 2. Consider the setting from Example 1, but with objective function fkB(W ) =∑n
i=1
(∑
c∈W βm(posvi(c)
)
. This function sums Borda scores of all the committee members
from all the voters and models the k-Borda voting rule (the committee with the highest score is
selected). The function is separable as for each candidate c it suffices to takewc = f
k-Borda({c}).
It is often argued that k-Borda is a good rule when our goal is to shortlist a set of individually
excellent candidates (Faliszewski et al., 2017).
Together, Example 1 and Example 2 show that our model suffices to capture many well-
known multiwinner voting scenarios. Many other voting rules, such as Proportional Approval
Voting, or many committee scoring rules, can be expressed through submodular objective func-
tions (Skowron, Faliszewski, and Lang, 2016; Faliszewski et al., 2016).
Diversity Specifications We focus on diversity specifications that regard each label indepen-
dently. In other words, the answer to the question if a given committee S is diverse or not
depends only on the cardinalities of the sets Cℓ ∩ S.
Definition 2. For a set of candidates C, a set of labels L, and a labeling function λ, we say that
a diversity specification D is independent (consists of independent constraints) if and only if
there is a function b : L → 2[|C|] (referred to as the cardinality constraint function) such that a
committee S is diverse exactly if for each label ℓ it holds that |S ∩ Cℓ| ∈ b(ℓ).
If we havem candidates then specifying independent constraints requires providing at most
m+1 numbers for each label. Thus independent constraints can easily be encoded in the inputs
for our algorithms.
Independent constraints are quite expressive. For example, they are sufficient to express
conditions such as “the committee must contain an even number of junior researchers” or, since
our committees are of a given fixed size, conditions of the form “the committee must contain at
least 40% females.” Indeed, the conditions of the latter form are so important that we consider
them separately.
Definition 3. For a set of candidates C, a set of labels L, and a labeling function λ, we say that
a diversity specificationD is interval-based (consists of interval constraints) if and only if there
are functions b1, b2 : L→ 2
[|C|] (referred to as the lower and upper interval constraint functions)
such that a committee S is diverse if and only if for each label ℓ it holds that b1(ℓ) ≤ |S ∩Cℓ| ≤
b2(ℓ).
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Figure 1: Illustration of a 1-laminar labeling structure.
Label Structures In principle, our model allows each candidate to have an arbitrary set of
labels. In practice, there usually are some dependencies between the labels and these depen-
dencies can have strong impact in the complexity of our problem. We focus on labels that are
arranged in independent, possibly hierarchically structured, layers.
Let C be a set of candidates, let L be a set of labels, and let λ be a labeling function. We say
that λ has 1-layered structure (i.e., we have a 1-layered labeling) if for each two distinct labels
x, y it holds that Cx∩Cy = ∅ (i.e., each candidate has at most one of these labels). For example,
if we restricted the example from the introduction to labels regarding the seniority level (junior
or senior), then we would have a 1-layered labeling.
More generally, we say that a labeling is 1-laminar if for each two distinct labels x, y we
have that either (a) Cx ∩ Cy = ∅ or (b) Cx ⊆ Cy or (c) Cy ⊆ Cx. In other words, 1-laminar
labellings allow the labels to be arranged hierarchically.
Example 3. Consider a set C = {a, b, c, d, e} of five candidates and labels that encode the
countries and continents where the candidates come from. Specifically, there are four countries
r1, r2, r3, r4, and two continents R1 and R2. The candidates are labeled as follows:
λ(a) = {r1, R1}, λ(b) = {r1, R1}, λ(c) = {r2, R1},
λ(d) = {r3, R2}, λ(e) = {r4, R2}.
Figure 1a illustrates the 1-laminar inclusion-wise relations between the labels (there can be
more levels of the hierarchy; for example, for each country there could be labels specifying
local administrative division).
Every 1-laminar labeling, together with the set of candidates, can be represented as a rooted
tree T in the following way: For a pair of distinct labels x, y we create an arc from x to y if
Cx ( Cy and there is no label z such that Cx ( Cz ( Cy. We add a root label r and we impose
that each candidate has this label; we add an arc from r to each label without an incoming arc.
The resulting digraph T is clearly a rooted tree. See Figure 1b for an illustration.
For each positive integer t, we say that a labeling is t-layered (respectively, t-laminar) if the
set L of labels can be partitioned into sets L1, L2, . . . , Lt such that for each i ∈ [t], the labeling
restricted to the labels from Li is 1-layered (respective, 1-laminar).
Example 4. In the example from the introduction, restricting our attention to candidates’ gender
and seniority levels, we get a 2-layered labeling structure. If we also consider labels regarding
countries and continents, then we get a 3-laminar structure (however, only the geographic labels
would be using the full power of laminar labellings).
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We assume that when we are given a t-layered (t-laminar) labeling structure, we are also
given the partition of the set of labels that defines this structure (in Section 5 we analyze the
problem of recognizing such structures algorithmically).
Balanced Committee Model As a very natural special case of our model we considered the
problem of computing balanced committees. In this case there are only two labels (e.g., male
and female), each candidate has exactly one label, and the constraint specification is that we
need to select exactly the same number of candidates with either label (thus, by definition, the
committee must be of an even size).
Computing balanced committees is a very natural problem. For example, seeking gender
balance is a common requirement in many settings. In this paper, we seek exact balance (that
is, we seek exactly the same number of candidates with either label) but allowing any other
proportion would lead to similar results.
3 Separable Objective Functions
Separable objective functions form a simple, but very important special case of our setting.
Indeed, such functions are very natural in shortlisting examples, where diversity constraints
are used to implement, e.g., affirmative actions or employment-equity laws. We organize our
discussion with respect to the type of constraint specifications.
Independent Constraints It turns out that independent constraints are quite difficult to work
with. If the labels are 1-laminar then polynomial-time algorithms exist (both for deciding if
feasible committees exist and for computing optimal ones), but with 2-layered labellings our
problems become NP-hard (recall that t-layered labellings are a special case of t-laminar ones).
Our polynomial-time algorithms proceed via dynamic programming and hardness proofs use
reductions from EXACT 3 SET COVER (X3C).
Theorem 4. Let D be a diversity specification of independent constraints. Suppose that λ is
1-laminar and f is separable. Then, DCWD can be solved in O(|L|2k2 + |C| log |C|)) time.
Moreover, DCF can be solved in O(|L|2k2) time. If the λ function is 2-layered then both prob-
lems are NP-hard (even if each candidate has at most two labels, and each label is associated
to at most three candidates).
Proof. We first consider the case where λ is 1-laminar and we give a polynomial-time algorithm.
Let b : L→ 2[|C|] be the cardinality constraint function corresponding to diversity specifica-
tionD of the input. Let T be a rooted tree representation for L; we denote by r the root label that
corresponds to the size k constraint on the whole committee size, i.e., Cr = C and b(r) = {k}.
Additionally, we add for every non-leaf label q in the tree representation of the labeling structure
(including the possibly newly created r) an artificial label q∗ with b(q∗) = [0, |C|] and add this
label to every candidate that has label q but none of the (original) child-labels of q. This step
clearly does no influence the solvability of our problem but ensures that every candidate has at
least one label that is a leaf node in the tree representation of the labeling structure.
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For each ℓ ∈ L, we denote by child(ℓ, i) the ith child of ℓ ∈ L in T , and by #children(ℓ)
number of children of ℓ ∈ L in T . By desc(ℓ)we denote the set of all descendants of ℓ (including
ℓ itself, i.e., ℓ ∈ desc(ℓ)). Furthermore, let best(ℓ, j) be the candidate from Cℓ with the jth
largest value according to f . For technical reasons, we introduce the ⊥ symbol as placeholder
for a non-existing (sub)committee and define X ∪ ⊥ := ⊥ for any set X . We set f(∅) := 0
and f(⊥) := −∞.
We describe a dynamic programming algorithm that solves DCWD using the in-
teger table Opt where Opt[ℓ, w, i] contains a (sub)committee W with maximum total
score f(W ) among all committees that consist of |W | = w candidates with labels
from {child(ℓ, 1), . . . , child(ℓ, i)} such that |W ∩ Cℓ′ | ∈ b(ℓ
′) for all ℓ′ ∈ desc(child(ℓ, j)) and
j = 1, 2, . . . , i.
It is not hard to verify that the overall solution for the DCWD instance can be read from the
table as Opt[r, k,#children(r)].
We will now show how to compute the table Opt in a bottom-up manner. For each leaf label-
node ℓ we set Opt[ℓ, w, 0] := {best(ℓ, j) | j ≤ w} if w ∈ b(ℓ), that is, Opt[ℓ, w, 0] is the set
of the w “best” candidates with label ℓ and, otherwise, we set Opt[ℓ, w, 0] := ⊥. For each inner
label-node ℓ, we set Opt[ℓ, w, 1] to Opt[child(ℓ, i), x∗,#children(child(ℓ, i))] where
x∗ := argmaxx∈[w]f(Opt[child(ℓ, i), x,#children(child(ℓ, i))])
if w ∈ b(ℓ) and, otherwise, we set Opt[ℓ, w, 1] := ⊥. Further, for each inner label-node ℓ and
i > 1, we set Opt[ℓ, w, i] to Opt[ℓ, w − x∗, i − 1] ∪ Opt[child(ℓ, i), x∗,#children(child(ℓ, i))]
where x∗ := argmaxx∈[w]f(Opt[ℓ, w − x, i− 1] ∪ Opt[child(ℓ, i), x,#children(child(ℓ, i))]) if
w ∈ b(ℓ) and, otherwise, we set Opt[ℓ, w, i] := ⊥.
As for the running time, sorting the candidates with respect to their value according to f
takes O(|C| · log |C|) time. The table is of size O(|L|2k) and computing a single table entries
takes at most O(k) time. The overall running time is O(|L|2k2 + |C| log |C|)) which is polyno-
mial since k ≤ |C|.
For DCF, we can skip to sort candidates which leads to the improved running time
O(|L|2k2).
Let us now consider the second part of the theorem. We use a reduction from the NP-hard
EXACT COVER BY 3-SETS which, given a finite set X and a collection S of size-3 subsets
of X , asks whether there is a subcollection S ′ ⊆ S that partitions X , that is, each element of
X is contained in exactly one subset from S ′. The reduction is similar to the reduction of
the somewhat closely related GENERAL FACTOR problem (Cornue´jols, 1988) and works as
follows: Create one element label x for each element x ∈ X and one set label S for each
subset S ∈ S. We set b(S) := {0, 3} for each S ∈ S and b(x) := {1} for each x ∈ X .
For each subset S = {x, x′, x′′} ∈ S, create three candidates c(S, x), c(S, x′), and c(S, x′′)
labeled with {S, x}, {S, x′}, and {S, x′′}, respectively. Finally, set the committee size k := |X|.
This completes the construction which can clearly be performed in polynomial time. For the
correctness, assume that there is a subcollection S ′ ⊆ S that partitionsX . It is easy to verify that
{c(S, x∗) | S ∈ S ′, x∗ ∈ S} is a D-diverse committee. Furthermore, let C∗ ⊆ C be an arbitrary
D-diverse committee. Now, S ′ = {S ∈ S | c(S, x) ∈ C∗ for some x ∈ S} partitions X: each
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element x ∈ X is covered exactly once since b(x) = {1} for all x ∈ X , and S ′ is pairwise
disjoint since b(S) = {0, 3} for all S ∈ S.
Given the above hardness results, it is immediate to ask about the parametrized complexity
of our problems because in many settings the label structures are very limited (for example, the
2-layered gender/seniority labeling from the introduction contains only 4 labels and already is
very relevant for practical applications). Unfortunately, for independent constraints our prob-
lems remain hard when parametrized by the number of labels.
Theorem 5. Both DCF and DCWD problems are W [1]-hard with respect to the number of
labels |L|, even if D is a diversity specification of independent constraints.
Proof. We describe a parametrized reduction from the W [1]-hard MULTICOLORED CLIQUE
(MCC) problem which, given an undirected graph G = (V,E), a non-negative integer h ∈ N,
and a vertex coloring φ : V → {1, 2, . . . , h}, asks whether graph G admits a colorful h-clique,
that is, a size-h vertex subsetH ⊆ V such that the vertices inH are pairwise adjacent and have
pairwise distinct colors. Without loss of generality, we assume that the number of vertices from
each color class equals some integer q ≤ |V |. Let (G = (V,E), φ) be an MCC instance. We
denote the set of vertices of color i as V (i) = {vi1, . . . , v
i
q}. We construct a DCF instance as
follows.
Labels. For each color i ∈ [h] we have a lower vertex label lowi and a higher higher
vertex label highi. For each (unordered) color pair i, j ∈ [h], i 6= j we have an edge label edi,j .
(So that |L| = 2h+ h(h− 1)/2 is obviously upper-bounded by some function in h.)
Candidates and Labeling. For each color i ∈ [h] and each vertex v ∈ V (i) we introduce
q(q + 1) lower color-i-selection candidates and q higher color-i-selection candidates. The la-
beling function λ is defined as follows. For each lower color-i-selection candidate c we have
λ(c) := {lowi, highi} ∪ {edi,j | j < i}. For each higher color-i-selection candidate c we have
λ(c) := {highi} ∪ {edi,j | j > i}. Introduce further h(q + 2)
2 dummy candidates u with
λ(u) := ∅.
Diversity Constraints. We define the cardinality constraint function b as follows. For each
color i ∈ [h] we set b(lowi) := {(q + 1)x | 1 ≤ x ≤ q} and set b(highi) := {y | 1 ≤ y ≤ q}.
For each (unordered) color pair i, j ∈ [h], i < j we set b(edi,j) := {(q + 1)x + y | there is an
edge between the xth vertex from V (i) and the yth vertex from V (j)}.
We finally set the committee size k := h(q+2)2. This completes the reduction which clearly
runs in polynomial time. It remains to show that the graph G has a colorful h-clique if and only
if the constructed DCF instance admits a diverse committee.
Assume that G has a colorful h-cliqueH . Let id(H, i) denote the index of the color i vertex
from H , that is, id(H, i) = x if and only if H contains the xth vertex of color i. It is not hard
to verify that a diverse committee can be constructed as follows. Start with a committee that
consists only of k dummy candidates. For each color i ∈ [h] replace (q + 1)id(H, i) dummy
candidates by lower color i-selection candidates and replace id(H, i) dummy candidates by
higher color i-selection candidates. The diversity constraints of the lower and higher vertex
labels are clearly fulfilled by this construction. Now, consider some edge label edi,j, i < j. Our
construction ensures that there are exactly id(H, i)(q + 1) lower color-i-selection candidates
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in the committee with label edi,j and further id(H, j) higher color-j-selection candidates with
label edi,j (and no further candidates with label edi,j). Since H is a clique, we know that the
id(H, i)th vertex of color i is adjacent to he id(H, j)th vertex of color j and thus id(H, i)(q +
1) + id(H, j) ∈ b(edi,j). Thus, also the diversity constraints for the edge labels are fulfilled and
the committee is indeed diverse.
Finally, assume that the constructed DCF instance admits some diverse committee. To ful-
fill the diversity constraints for the lower vertex labels for each color i ∈ [h] there is some
number id(i) such that there are exactly (q + 1)id(i) lower color-i-selection candidates and
further id(i) higher color-i-selection candidates in the committee. (The former is directly en-
forced by the diversity constraints for the lower vertex labels and the latter follows then imme-
diately from the diversity constraints for the higher vertex labels.) We claim that H = {vHi |
vertex vi is the id(i)th vertex of color i} is an h-colored clique. It is clear from the definition
of H that |H| = h and that H is h-colored but it remains to show that H is indeed a clique.
To show this, suppose towards a contradiction that there are two colors i, j ∈ [h], i < j such
that vertex vHi and vertex v
H
j are not adjacent. Now, there are exactly id(i)(q+1) lower color-i-
selection candidates in the committee with label edi,j and further id(j) higher color-j-selection
candidates with label edi,j (and no further candidates with label edi,j). Furthermore, since the
diversity constraint of label edi,j is fulfilled, it must hold that id(i)(q+1)+ id(j) ∈ b(edi,j) and
so that vertex vHi and vertex v
H
j are adjacent—a contradiction.
However, not all is lost and sometimes brute-force algorithms are sufficiently effective. For
example, if we have a t-layered labeling (where t is a small constant) then each candidate has
at most t different labels and it suffices to consider each size-t labeling separately. A brute-
force algorithm based on this idea suffices, e.g., for the example from the seniority/specialty
labels from the introduction (it would have O(|C|4) running time, because there are 4 combi-
nations of labels {junior , senior} and {AI , economics}; the algorithm could also deal with
non-independent constraints).
Interval constraints Interval constraints are more restrictive than general independent ones,
but usually suffice for practical applications and are more tractable. For example, for the case
of 1-laminar labellings we give a linear-time algorithm for recognizing if a feasible committee
exists (for independent constraints, our best algorithm for this task is quadratic).
Theorem 6. Let D be a diversity specification of interval constraints. If λ is 1-laminar, then
DCF can be solved in O(|C|+ |L|) time.
Proof. Let b1 and b2 denote the lower and upper interval constraint functions, respectively. Let
T be a rooted tree representation for L; we denote by r the root label that corresponds to the
size k constraint on the whole committee size, i.e., Cr = C and b1(r) = b2(r) = k. For each
ℓ ∈ L, we denote by child(ℓ) the set of children of ℓ and by desc(ℓ) the set of descendants of ℓ
in T (including ℓ).
For every label ℓ ∈ L, let Kℓ be the set of committees W ⊆ Cℓ satisfying the constraints
up until ℓ, namely, b1(x) ≤ |W ∩ Cx| ≤ b2(x) for each x ∈ desc(ℓ); then, we define A1[ℓ]
(respectively, A2[ℓ]) to be the minimum (respectively, the maximum) value w for which there
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is a set W ∈ Kℓ with |W | = w. If there exists no committee satisfying the aforementioned
constraints we set A1[ℓ] and A2[ℓ] to ∞ and −∞, respectively. Clearly, there is a D-diverse
committee if and only if A1[r] = A2[r] = k. The values A1[ℓ] and A2[ℓ] can be efficiently
computed by a dynamic programming in a bottom-up manner as follows.
For each leaf ℓ ∈ L at T , we set A1[ℓ] = b1(ℓ) and A2[ℓ] = min{b2(ℓ), |Cℓ|} if b1(ℓ) ≤
min{b2(ℓ), |Cℓ|}; we setA1[ℓ] = +∞ andA2[ℓ] = −∞ otherwise. For each internal node ℓ ∈ L,
we set A1[ℓ] = max{
∑
x∈child(ℓ) T1(x), b1(ℓ)} and A2[ℓ] = min{
∑
x∈child(ℓ)A2[x], b2(ℓ), |Cℓ|}
if
• A1[x] ≤ A2[x] for all child x ∈ child(ℓ); and
• there are enough candidates in Cℓ to fill in the lower bound (|Cℓ| ≥ A1[ℓ]) and the lower
bound does not exceed the upper bound, i.e.,
max{
∑
x∈child(ℓ)
A1[x], b1(ℓ)} ≤ min{
∑
x∈child(ℓ)
A2[x], b2(ℓ), |Cℓ|}.
Otherwise, we set A1[ℓ] = +∞ and A2[ℓ] = −∞. This can be done in O(|C| + |L|) time
since each |Cℓ| for ℓ ∈ L can be computed in O(|C|) time and since the size of the dynamic
programming table is at most |L| and each entry can be filled in constant time.
Now we will show by induction that for each ℓ ∈ L and each w ∈ N, there is a setW ∈ Kℓ
of size w if and only if A1[ℓ] ≤ w ≤ A2[ℓ]. The claim is immediate when child(ℓ) = ∅. Now
consider an internal node ℓ ∈ L and suppose that the claim holds for all x ∈ child(ℓ).
Suppose first that A1[ℓ] ≤ w ≤ A2[ℓ]. By induction hypothesis, for each child x ∈ child(ℓ),
there is a committee Wx ∈ Kx where |Wx| = wx for any wx ∈ [A1[x], A2[x]]. By combining
all such committees, we have that for any t ∈ [
∑
x∈child(ℓ)A1[x],
∑
x∈child(ℓ) T2(x)], there is
a committee W ⊆ Cℓ of size t such that W ∩ Cx ∈ Kx for all x ∈ child(ℓ). In particular,
since w ∈ [
∑
x∈child(ℓ)A1[x],
∑
x∈child(ℓ) T2(x)], there is a set W ⊆ Cℓ of size w such that
W ∩ Cx ∈ Kx for all x ∈ child(ℓ). Since b1(ℓ) ≤ w ≤ b2(ℓ), we haveW ∈ Kℓ.
Conversely, suppose that w does not belong to the interval [A1[ℓ], A2[ℓ]]. Suppose towards
a contradiction that there is a set W ∈ Kℓ of size w. Notice that for each x ∈ child(ℓ), it
holds that W ∩ Cx ∈ Kx and hence A1[x] ≤ |W ∩ Cx| ≤ A2[x] by induction hypothesis. If
w < b1(ℓ) or w > b2(ℓ), it is clear that W 6∈ Kℓ, a contradiction. Further, if w > |Cℓ|, W
cannot be a subset of Cℓ, a contradiction. If w <
∑
x∈child(ℓ)A1[ℓ], then |W ∩ Cx| < A1[x]
for some label x ∈ child(ℓ); however, since W ∩ Cx ∈ Kx, we have |W ∩ Cx| ≥ A1[x] by
induction hypothesis, a contradiction. A similar argument leads to a contradiction if we assume
w >
∑
x∈child(ℓ)A1[ℓ].
For the case of computing the winning committee we no longer obtain a significant speedup
from focusing on interval constraints, but we do get a much better structural understanding of
the problem. In particular, we can use a greedy algorithm instead of relying on dynamic pro-
gramming. Briefly put, our algorithm (presented as Algorithm 1) starts with an empty commit-
tee and performs k iterations (k is the desired committee size), in each extending the committee
with a candidate that increases the score maximally, while ensuring that the committee can still
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Algorithm 1: Greedy Algorithm 1
notation :KD 6= ∅ is the set of D-diverse, size-k committees, KD is its lower extension.
input :f : 2C → R: the objective function,
k: the size of the committee.
output :W ∈ KD
1 setW = ∅;
2 while |W | < k do
3 choose a candidate y ∈ C \W such thatW ∪ {y} ∈ KD with the maximum
improvement f({c}|W );
4 setW ←W ∪ {y};
be extended to one that meets the diversity constraints. To show that this greedy algorithm is
correct and that it can be implemented efficiently, we use some notions from the matroid theory.
Formally, a matroid is an ordered pair (C, I), where C is some finite set and I is a family
of its subsets (referred to as the independent sets of the matroid). We require that (I1) ∅ ∈ I,
(I2) if S ⊆ T ∈ I, then S ∈ I, and (I3) if S, T ∈ I and |S| > |T |, then there exists s ∈ S \ T
such that T ∪ {s} ∈ I. The family of maximal (with respect to inclusion) independent sets
of a matroid is called its basis. Many of our arguments use results from matroid theory, but
often used in very different contexts than originally developed. In particular, the next theorem,
in essence, translates the results of Yokoi (2017) to our setting.
Theorem 7. Let D be a diversity specification of interval constraints. Suppose that λ is a 1-
laminar, and f is a separable function given by a weight vectorw : C → R. Then, DCWD can
be solved in O(k2|C||L|+ |C| log |C|) time.
Proof. Let KD be the set of D-diverse committees of size k and assume that KD is nonempty.
For a family of subsets K of a finite set C, we define its lower extension3 by
K = { T | ∃S ∈ K : T ⊆ S }.
It is known that if our constraints are given by intervals, the lower extension KD of KD com-
prises the independent sets of a matroid wheneverKD 6= ∅ (Yokoi, 2017). Thus, the greedy algo-
rithm (Algorithm 1) finds an optimal solutionW ∈ argmaxW ′∈KDf(W
′) (see, e.g., the book of
Korte and Vygen (2006), Chapter 13). By construction, |W | = k and henceW is a maximal ele-
ment inKD, which follows thatW ∈ KD. SinceKD ⊆ KD, we haveW ∈ argmaxW ′∈KDf(W
′).
Further, Yokoi (2017) showed that checking whether a set W ∪ {y} belongs to KD can be ef-
ficiently done by maintaining a set B ∈ KD with W ⊆ B; thus, the greedy algorithm runs in
polynomial time
3Note that the lower extension does not necessarily ignore the lower bounds. For instance, consider when we
want to select a committee of size 3 such that there are exactly three female candidates and at most two male
candidates; the corresponding lower extension KD only includes the sets of female candidates of size at most 3,
whereas a male-only committee of size 2 satisfies the upper bounds.
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Now it remains to analyze the running time of the algorithm. Sorting the candidates from
the best to the worst requires O(|C| log |C|) time, given a weight vector w. In each step, we
need to check whether a set W ∪ {y} belongs to KD. Yokoi (2017) showed that this can be
efficiently done by maintaining a set B ∈ KD withW ⊆ B. Specifically, the following lemma
holds.
Lemma 8 (Lemma 6 of Yokoi, 2017). Let (C, I) be a matroid. LetW be an independent set of
the matroid, B be a basis withW ⊆ B, and y ∈ C \W . Then, W ∪ {y} is independent if and
only if y ∈ B or (B ∪ {y}) \ {x} is a basis for some x ∈ B \W .
The lemma implies that provided a set B ∈ KD withW ⊆ B, decidingW ∪ {y} ∈ KD can
be verified by checking whether y ∈ B or (B ∪{y}) \ {x} ∈ KD for some x ∈ B \W ; this can
be done in O(k2|L|) time. One can maintain such a superset B ∈ KD ofW by first computing
a set B ∈ KD in O(|C|+ |L|) time as we have proved in Theorem 6, and updating the set B in
each step as follows: If y 6∈ B, then find a candidate x ∈ B \W such that (B∪{y})\{x} ∈ KD,
and set B = (B ∪ {y}) \ {x}; otherwise, we do not change the set B. Since there are at most
|C| iterations, the greedy algorithm runs in O(k2|C||L|) time.
Unfortunately, the greedy algorithm does not work for more involved labeling structures,
but for 2-laminar labellings we can compute winning committees by reducing the problem to
the matroid intersection problem (Edmonds, 1979). For more involved labeling structures our
problems become NP-hard.
Theorem 9. Let D be a diversity specification of interval constraints. Suppose that λ is 2-
laminar and f is separable. Then, DCF can be solved in O(k2|C|3|L|) time, and DCWD can
be solved in O(k|C|3 + k3|C|2|L|) time.
In the subsequent proof, we will use the following notions and results in matroid theory:
Given a matroid (C, I), the sets in 2C \ I are called dependent, and a minimal dependent set of
a matroid is called circuit. Crucial properties of circuits are the following.
Lemma 10. Let (C, I) be a matroid,W ∈ I, and y ∈ C \W such thatW ∪{y} 6∈ I. Then the
setW ∪ {y} contains a unique circuit.
We write C(W, y) for the unique circuit inW ∪ {y}. The set C(W, y) can be characterized
by the elements that can replace y, i.e., for each independent set W of a matroid (C, I) and
y ∈ C \W withW ∪ {y} 6∈ I,
C(W, y) = { x ∈ W ∪ {y} |W ∪ {y} \ {x} ∈ I }.
The following lemma by Frank (1981) serves as a fundamental property for proving the
matroid intersection theorem.
Lemma 11 (Frank, 1981). Let (C, I) be a matroid and W ∈ I. Let x1, x2, . . . , xs ∈ W and
y1, y2, . . . , ys 6∈ W whereW ∪ {yj} 6∈ I for j ∈ [s]. Suppose that
(i) xj ∈ C(W, yj) for j ∈ [s] and
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(ii) xj 6∈ C(W, yt) for 1 ≤ j < t < s.
Then, (W \ {x1, x2, . . . , xs}) ∪ {y1, y2, . . . , ys} ∈ I.
Now we are ready to prove Theorem 9.
Proof. Let b1 and b2 denote the lower and upper interval constraint functions, respectively. Let
L = L1 ∪ L2, L1 ∩ L2 = ∅ be a partition of L such that for each i = 1, 2, the labeling restricted
to the labels from Li is 1-laminar. For i = 1, 2, we denote by Ki the set of committees of size
k satisfying the constrains in Li, i.e., Ki = {S ⊆ C | |S| = k and b1(ℓ) ≤ |S ∩ Cℓ| ≤
b2(ℓ) for all ℓ ∈ Li }. If at least one of them is empty, then there is no D-diverse committee;
thus we assume otherwise. We have argued that the lower extension Ki for each i = 1, 2 forms
the independent sets of a matroid when λ|Li is 1-laminar. Thus, our problem can be reduced
to finding a maximum common independent set over the two matroids. That is, we will try to
compute the following value:
max{ |W | |W ∈ K1 ∩ K2 }.
Clearly, there is a D-diverse committee of size k if and only the maximum value equals k.
It is well-known that this problem can be solved by Edmond’s matroid intersection algorithm
(Edmonds, 1979), given a membership oracle for each Ki. The idea is that starting with the
empty set, we repeatedly find ‘alternating paths’ and augment W by one element in each iter-
ation while keeping the property W ∈ K1 ∩K2. Specifically, we apply the notion C(W, y) to
(C,Ki) and write Ci(W, y) for each i = 1, 2. For W ∈ K1 ∩ K2, we define an auxiliary graph
GW = (C,A
(1)
W ∪ A
(2)
W ) where the set of arcs is given by
A
(1)
W = { (x, y) |W ∪ {y} 6∈ K1 ∧ x ∈ C1(W, y) },
A
(2)
W = { (y, x) |W ∪ {y} 6∈ K2 ∧ x ∈ C2(W, y) },
for i = 1, 2. We then look for a shortest path from S
(1)
W to S
(2)
W , where
S
(i)
W = { y ∈ C \W | W ∪ {y} ∈ Ki },
for i = 1, 2. We increase the size ofW by taking the symmetric difference with the path. It was
shown that this procedure computes the desired value. We provide a formal description of the
algorithm below (Algorithm 2).
Similarly to Yokoi (2017), we can efficiently construct an auxiliary graph in each step by
maintaining a set Bi such that W ⊆ Bi and Bi ∈ Ki for each i = 1, 2: First, as we have
seen in Lemma 8, we can determine the membership of a given set in Ki in polynomial time.
Moreover, it can be easily verified that the unique circuit Ci(W, y) coincides with Ci(Bi, y)
whenW ∪ {y} 6∈ Ki.
Lemma 12. Let (C, I) be a matroid. LetW be an independent set of the matroid, B be a basis
withW ⊆ B, and y ∈ C \W withW ∪ {y} being dependent. Then, C(W, y) = C(B, y).
Proof. Notice that B ∪ {y} is dependent: thus it contains a unique circuit C(B, y). Then,
C(B, y) = C(W, y) clearly holds since C(W, y) ⊆ B ∪ {y}.
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Thus, we will show how to maintain such a set Bi ∈ Ki with W ⊆ Bi for each i = 1, 2.
We will first compute a set Bi ∈ Ki for each i = 1, 2 in O(|C||L|) time. Now suppose that
W ∈ K1 ∩ K2. Let Bi ∈ Ki where W ⊆ Bi for i = 1, 2, and P = (y0, x1, y1, . . . , xs, ys) be
a shortest path in GW with y0 ∈ S
(1)
W and ys ∈ S
(2)
W . Notice that yj 6∈ B1 for j = 1, 2, . . . , s
since otherwise B1 contains a dependent setW ∪ {yj} of a matroid (C,K1), contradicting (I2);
similarly, yj 6∈ B2 for j = s, s−1, . . . , 1 since otherwiseB2 contains a dependent setW ∪{yj}
of a matroid (C,K2), a contradiction. If y0 6∈ B1, then there is a candidate x ∈ B1 \W such
that (B1 ∪ {y0}) \ {x} ∈ K1 by Lemma 8, and we set B1 to be (B1 ∪ {y0}) \ {x}. Similarly, if
ys 6∈ B2, then there is a candidate x ∈ B2 \W such that (B2 ∪ {ys}) \ {x} ∈ K2 by Lemma 8,
and we set B2 to be (B2 ∪ {y0}) \ {x}. We then update each Bi as follows.
B′i = (Bi ∪ {y0, y1, . . . , ys}) \ {x1, x2, . . . , xs}.
Clearly,W ∪{y0, y1, . . . , ys})\{x1, x2, . . . , xs} ⊆ B
′
i for each i = 1, 2 since y0, y1, . . . , ys 6∈ W
and x1, x2, . . . , xs ∈ W ; further we have the following.
Claim 13. For i = 1, 2, B′i ∈ Ki.
Proof. First, we show that B1 ∪ {y0}, y1, y2, . . . , ys, and x1, x2, . . . , xs satisfy the requirements
of Lemma 11. Since y0 ∈ B1, we know that B1 = B1∪{y0} ∈ K1. The condition (i) is satisfied
because (xj , yj) ∈ A
(1)
W and C1(W, yj) = C1(B1, yj) for all j = 1, 2, . . . , s. The condition (ii) is
satisfied because otherwise xj 6∈ C(B, yt) = C(W, yt) for some j < t and hence the path could
be shortcut. Thus, B′1 ∈ K1. Moreover, since |B1| = |B
′
1| = k, B
′
1 is a maximal set in K1 and
hence B′1 ∈ K1. Similarly, one can show that B2∪{ys}, ys−1, ys−2, . . . , y0, and xs, xs−1, . . . , x1
satisfy the requirements of Lemma 11, and therefore B′2 ∈ K2.
It remains to analyze the running time of the algorithm. By Lemma 8 and Lemma 12, con-
structing an auxiliary graphGW can be done inO(k
2|C|2|L|) time, given that we have a superset
Bi of W where Bi ∈ Ki, and finding a shortest path can be done in O(|C|) time by breadth
first search. Since there are at most |C| augmentations, the overall running time isO(k2|C|3|L|)
time.
Theorem 14. Let D be a diversity specification of interval constraints. Suppose that λ is 2-
laminar and f is a separable function given by a weight vector w : C → R. Then, DCWD can
be solved in O(k|C|3 + k3|C|2|L|) time.
Proof. Again, for i = 1, 2, we denote by Ki the set of committees of size k satisfying the
constrains in Li, i.e., Ki = {S ⊆ C | |S| = k and b1(ℓ) ≤ |S ∩ Cℓ| ≤ b2(ℓ) for all ℓ ∈ Li }.
We assume that K1 ∩ K2 is nonempty. Frank (1981) has shown that for each k
′ ∈ [k], one can
calculateWk′ ∈ K1 ∩ K2 where
f(Wk′) = max{ f(W ) |W ∈ K1 ∩ K2 ∧ |W | = k
′ }
in O(|C|3 + γ), where γ is the time required for constructing an auxiliary graph GW for each
W ∈ K1 ∩ K2. This completes the proof.
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Algorithm 2:Matroid intersection
input :Ki 6= ∅ for i = 1, 2.
output :W ∈ K1 ∩ K2 of maximum cardinality
1 setW = ∅;
2 compute Bi ∈ Ki for each i = 1, 2;
3 while there is a shortest path P = (y0, x1, y1, . . . , xs, ys) from S
(1)
W to S
(2)
W in GW do
4 if y0 6∈ B1 then
5 find x ∈ B1 \W such that (B1 \ {x}) ∪ {y0} ∈ K1;
6 set B1 = (B1 \ {x}) ∪ {y0};
7 if ys 6∈ B2 then
8 find x ∈ B2 \W such that (B2 \ {x}) ∪ {ys} ∈ K2;
9 set B2 = (B2 \ {x}) ∪ {ys};
10 setW = W ∪ {y0, y1, . . . , ys}) \ {x1, x2, . . . , xs} and
Bi = Bi ∪ {y0, y1, . . . , ys}) \ {x1, x2, . . . , xs} for each i = 1, 2;
The bound on the number of layers turns out to be necessary: the following theorem shows
that finding a D-diverse committee is intractable even with 3-layers.
Theorem 15. DCF is NP-hard even if D is a diversity specification of interval constraints and
λ is 3-layered.
Proof. We reduce from 3-DIMENSIONAL MATCHING (3-DM). Given three disjoint sets
X, Y, Z of size n and a set T ⊆ X × Y × Z of ordered triplets, 3-DM asks whether there is a
set of n triplets in T such that each element is contained in exactly one triplet.
Given an instance ((X, Y, Z), T ) of 3-DM, we create one candidate ti = (xi, yi, Bi) for each
ti ∈ T . The set of labels is given by L = X ∪ Y ∪Z. Each candidate ti has exactly three labels
λ(ti) = {xi, yi, Bi}. The lower bound b1(ℓ) and the upper bound b2(ℓ) of each label ℓ ∈ L are
set to be 1. Lastly, we set k = n. It can be easily verified thatW ⊆ T is a desired solution for
3-DM if and only ifW is a D-diverse committee of size k, namely, |W | = k, and
• |Cx ∩W | = 1 for each x ∈ X ,
• |Cy ∩W | = 1 for each y ∈ Y , and
• |Cz ∩W | = 1 for each z ∈ Z.
Nevertheless, if the number of labels is small (i.e., is taken as the parameter from the point
of view of parametrized complexity theory) we can compute optimal diverse committees effi-
ciently. The next theorem expresses this formally (note that interval diversity specifications can
be phrased as linear programs, but this language allows also some more involved constraints,
such as, “at the research meeting the number of senior researchers should be larger than the
number of junior ones, but without taking the PhD students into account”).
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Theorem 16. Let f be separable objective function and letD be a diversity specification which
can be expressed through a linear program LP with the set of variables {xℓ : ℓ ∈ L} such that
d ∈ D if and only if LP instantiated with variables xℓ giving the numbers of committee members
with labels ℓ is feasible. Then, DCWD is in FPT with respect to |L|.
Proof. To prove the theorem we will use the classic result of Lenstra (1983) which states that
the problem of solving a mixed integer program is in FPT for the parameter being the number of
integer variables. We create the following mixed integer linear program. For each combination
of labels Y ∈ 2L we create an integer variable zY . Each zY denotes the number of committee
members which have exactly the labels from Y in an optimal committee. Further, for each
Y ∈ 2L we construct a function gY : N → R in the following way: gY (x) = maxS : |S|=x f(S).
In words, gY (x) gives the value of the best, according to the objective function f and ignoring
the distribution constraints, x-element committee which consists only of candidates who have
sets of labels equal to Y . Clearly, since f is separable, the functions gY are piecewise-linear and
concave. We will construct a mixed ILP with the following non-linear objective function:
minimize
∑
Y ∈2L
gY (zY ).
We can use piecewise linear concave functions in the minimized objective functions by the
result of Bredereck et al. (2017) (Theorem 2 in their work)—such programs can still be solved
in FPT time with respect to the number of integer variables. The set of constraints is defined
by taking the feasibility linear program LP and for each ℓ ∈ L setting xℓ =
∑
Y : ℓ∈Y zY .
4 Submodular Objective Functions
The case of submodular objective functions is computationally far more difficult than that of
separable ones. Indeed, even without diversity constraints computing a winning Chamberlin–
Courant committee (specified through a submodular objective function) is NP-hard (Lu
and Boutilier, 2011) and, in general, the best polynomial-time approximation algorithm for
submodular functions is the classic greedy algorithm (Nemhauser, Wolsey, and Fisher, 1978;
Feige, 1998), which achieves the 1 − 1/e ≈ 0.63 approximation ratio. 4 Adding diversity con-
straints makes our problems even more difficult. Nonetheless, we provide a polynomial-time
1/2-approximation algorithm for the case of interval constraints and 1-laminar labellings.
Theorem 17. Let D be a diversity specification of interval constraints. If λ is 1-laminar and
f is a monotone submodular function, then Algorithm 1 gives 1
2
-approximation algorithm for
DCWD.
Proof. Fisher, Nemhauser, and Wolsey (1978) showed that if KD is the set of independent sets
of a matroid, Algorithm 1 produces a solution W such that f(W ) ≥ 1
2
f(O′′) for any optimal
solution O′′ ∈ argmaxW ′∈KDf(W
′). Now let O′ ∈ argmaxW ′∈KDf(W
′). Since KD ⊆ KD, we
have f(W ) ≥ 1
2
f(O′). Clearly, by construction,W ∈ K(D).
4This algorithm starts with an empty committee and extends it with candidates one-by-one, always choosing
the candidate that increases the objective function maximally.
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Algorithm 3: Greedy Algorithm for BCWD
input :f : 2C → R, A ⊆ C and B ⊆ C where A ∩ B = ∅, |A| ≥ k′ and |B| ≥ k′
output :W ⊆ C where |W ∩A| = |W ∩B| = k′
1 while |W | < 2k′ do
2 choose a pair e = {a, b} where a ∈ A \W and b ∈ B \W with maximum
improvement f(e|W );
3 setW ←W ∪ e;
Balanced Committees For the balanced committee model it is possible to achieve notably
stronger results. Since the balanced case is practically relevant from practical standpoint, we
provide its simpler definition, renaming it as BCWD.
Definition 18 (BCWD). Given a set of candidates C, two subsetsA,B ⊆ C such that A∩B =
∅ and A ∪ B = C, a desired committee size k = 2k′, and an objective function f , find a
committeeW ⊆ C that maximizes f(W ) and that satisfies |W ∩A| = |W ∩B| = k′.
For the case of BCWD, we provide a polynomial-time 1−1/e approximation algorithm. Since
this is the best possible approximation ratio for general submodular functions without diversity
constraints, it is also the best one for the balanced setting (formally, the results without diversity
constraints translate because we could assume that all the candidates with one of the labels
have no influence on the objective value and use the remaining ones to model an unconstrained
submodular optimization problem). Our algorithm (presented as Algorithm 3) is very similar to
the classic greedy algorithm, but it considers candidates in pairs.
Theorem 19. Let f be a monotone submodular function. Algorithm 3 gives (1 − 1
e
)-
approximation algorithm for BCWD.
Proof. We first observe the following lemma.
Lemma 20. Let f be a submodular function. Then, for any S ⊆ T and any subset X ⊆ C \ T
of candidates,
f(X|T ) ≤ f(X|S).
Proof. Let P = S ∪X and Q = T . Then P ∩Q = S and P ∪Q = T ∪X . Hence,
f(P ∪Q) + f(P ∩Q) ≤ f(P ) + f(Q)
⇔ f(T ∪X) + f(S) ≤ f(S ∪X) + f(T )
⇔ f(T ∪X)− f(T ) ≤ f(S ∪X)− f(S)
⇔ f(X|T ) ≤ f(X|S).
Let Wi be our greedy solution after i iterations of the algorithm and ei = {ai, bi} be the
pair chosen in the iteration where ai ∈ A and bi ∈ B. Let O
′ be an optimal solution where
|O′ ∩ A| = |O′ ∩ B| = k′. We first prove the following lemma.
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Lemma 21. f(Wi) ≥
1
k′
f(O′) + (1− 1
k′
)f(Wi)
Proof. Let O′ \Wi = {a
′
1, . . . , a
′
p} ∪ {b
′
1, . . . , b
′
q} where each a
′
s ∈ A and b
′
t ∈ B for s ∈ [p]
and t ∈ [q]. Without loss of generality, suppose that p ≥ q. Clearly, we have p ≤ k′. Also,
f(O′) ≤ f(O′ ∪ Wi) by the monotonicity of f . Now, we let e
′
j = {a
′
j, b
′
j} for j ∈ [q], and
observe that
f(O′ ∪Wi) = f(Wi) +
q∑
j=1
f(e′j |Wi ∪ e
′
1 ∪ . . . ∪ e
′
j−1)
+
p−q∑
j=1
f(a′q+j|Wi ∪ e
′
1 ∪ . . . ∪ e
′
q ∪ {a
′
q+1, . . . , a
′
q+j−1})
≤ f(Wi) +
q∑
j=1
f(e′j|Wi) +
p−q∑
j=1
f(a′q+j|Wi)
≤ f(Wi) +
q∑
j=1
f(e′j|Wi) +
p−q∑
j=1
f({a′q+j, ai+1}|Wi)
≤ f(Wi) + qf(ei+1|Wi) + (p− q)f(ei+1|Wi).
Here the first inequality follows from Lemma 20, the second inequality follows from the mono-
tonicity of f , and the third inequality follows from the choice of ei+1. Now, since p ≤ k
′, we
have f(O′ ∪Wi) ≤ f(Wi) + k
′f(ei+1|Wi). Thus, f(O
′) ≤ f(Wi) + k
′f(ei+1|Wi).
Now by a usual calculation, we have
f(Wk′) ≥
1
k′
f(O′) + (1−
1
k′
)f(Wk′−1)
≥ · · ·
≥ f(O′) · [1− (1−
1
k′
)k
′
]
≥ f(O′)(1−
1
e
).
We note that Theorem 19 is a special case of a much more general result on approximating
the Multidimensional Knapsack problem (Kulik, Shachnai, and Tamir, 2013), which gives the
same approximation ratio even for maximizing monotone submodular functions subject to in-
terval constraints consisting only of upper bounds. Yet, our algorithm is simpler and faster than
this general approach.
Theorem 19 applies to all submodular functions. However, for some special cases it is pos-
sible to achieve much stronger results. For example, for the Chamberlin–Courant function we
find a polynomial-time approximation scheme (PTAS).
Theorem 22. For each Chamberlin–Courant function there exists a PTAS for BCWD.
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The main idea behind the proof is to use the PTAS of Skowron, Faliszewski, and Slinko
(2015) to compute a committee of size k′ and then to complement it so that it satisfies the
diversity constraints. The specific nature of the algorithm of Skowron et al. makes it possible to
do this efficiently and effectively.
Proof. Let V be the set of n voters used to represent the Chamberlin–Courant objective function
f . We first make a simple observation that for each S ⊆ C we have f(S) =
∑
vi∈V
maxc∈S(m−
posi(c)) ≤
∑
vi∈V
m = nm. We will use as a black box the result ofSkowron, Faliszewski,
and Slinko (2015)[Theorem 11] who have shown an algorithm for selecting a committee S
of k candidates such that f(S) ≥ nm
(
1− 2w(k)
k
)
, where w is the Lambert’s W -function (in
particular w(k) = o(log(k))). Now, for each ǫ > 0 we can construct a polynomial-time (1− ǫ)-
approximation algorithm for BCWD as follows. We first define a threshold value kt ∈ N, as a
smallest integer such that
2w(kt)
kt
≤ ǫ. Now, if k < kt, then we run a brute-force algorithm trying
each k-element subset of the set of candidates and, this way, we can find an exactly optimal
committee. If k > kt, we run the algorithm of Skowron et al. for the instance of our problem
without constraints and for the size of the committee equal to k; here we have ǫ ≥ 2w(kt)
kt
≥ 2w(k)
k
.
Next, we complement the committee returned by this algorithmwith some k candidates selected
in an arbitrary way so that the diversity constraints are satisfied. Since, adding the candidates can
only increase the value of the Chamberlin–Courant objective function, the value of the objective
function for such constructed committee is at least equal to nm(1− 2w(k)
k
) ≥ nm(1− ǫ). Thus,
this is a (1− ǫ)-approximation committee.
Theorem 22 also extends to the case of the constant number of labels ℓ1, ℓ
′
1, ℓ2, ℓ
′
2, . . . , ℓp, ℓ
′
p
which satisfy the following two conditions: (i) all the constraints have the following form: for
i ∈ [p] we require the same number of candidates with label ℓi as those with label ℓ
′
i, (ii) for
each combination of labels (r1, r2, . . . , rp) with ri ∈ {ℓi, ℓ
′
i} for each i ∈ [p], there exist at least
k candidates having all labels r1, . . . , rp.
5 Recognizing Structure of the Labels
In this section we ask how difficult it is to recognize a given labeling structure if it is not
provided with the problem. While in most cases it is natural to assume that the structure would
be provided (as it would be a common knowledge of the society for which we would want to
compute the committee), it is interesting to be able to derive it automatically.
In the previous sections we have seen that there usually are polynomial-time algorithms for
computing winning committees for 1-laminar labellings and, sometimes, there are such algo-
rithms for 2-laminar ones. However, 3-laminar labellings always lead to NP-hardness results.
The same holds for the label-structure recognition problem. There are algorithms that decide if
given labellings are 1- or 2-laminar, but recognizing 3-layered ones is NP-hard. In the labeling-
recognition problem we are given a set of candidatesC, a set of labels L, and a labeling function
λ. Our goal is to recognize if λ is t-laminar (or t-layered), for a given t.
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Proposition 23. For t ∈ {1, 2} there exists a polynomial-time algorithm for deciding if a given
labeling λ is t-laminar. The problem of deciding if a given labeling λ is 3-layered is NP-hard.
Proof. For t = 1we can simply check if for each two labels ℓ1, ℓ2 ∈ L it holds thatCℓ1\Cℓ2 = ∅
or Cℓ2 \ Cℓ1 = ∅. For t = 2 we reduce the problem to 2-satisfiability (2SAT), which can be
solved in polynomial time. Let us recall that a labeling λ is 2-laminar if L can be represented as
a disjoint union of L1 and L2 such that λ|Li is 1-laminar for each i = 1, 2.
For each label ℓ ∈ L we create one Boolean variable xℓ. Intuitively, if xℓ = True then
ℓ ∈ L1, and if xℓ = False, then ℓ ∈ L2. For each two labels ℓ1, ℓ2 ∈ L such that Cℓ1 \ Cℓ2 6= ∅
and Cℓ2 \Cℓ1 6= ∅ we include two clauses: (xℓ1 ∨ xℓ2) and (¬xℓ1 ∨¬xℓ2)—these clauses ensure
that xℓ1 6= xℓ2 .
It is apparent that such constructed instance of 2SAT is satisfiable if and only if λ is 2-
laminar.
For t = 3 we give a reduction from the partition into 3 cliques problem, which is NP-hard
(Garey and Johnson, 1979). In this problem we are given a graph G = (V,E) and we ask if it
is possible to partition the set of vertices V into three sets such that the graphs induced by them
are cliques.
For each vertex x ∈ V we introduce a vertex label x, and for each non-adjacent pair of
vertices {x, y} /∈ E we introduce a candidate c{x,y} with labels corresponding to x and y. First,
we will show that if it is possible to partition the so-constructed graph into three cliques, V1, V2
and V3, then the labeling is 3-layered with the layers corresponding to V1, V2 and V3. For that we
need to show that the constructed labeling is 1-layered when restricted to Vi for i ∈ [3]. Towards
a contradiction, assume this is not the case, i.e., that there exist two labels x, y ∈ Vi such that
Cx ∩ Cy 6= ∅. Let c ∈ Cx ∩ Cy. Given that we constructed c, we infer that x and y were not
adjacent in G, a contradiction.
On the other hand, suppose that the labeling is 3-layered, with layers V1, V2, V3. Then Vi for
i ∈ [3] is a clique. Indeed, if there is a pair of labels x, y ∈ Vi with {x, y} /∈ E, then there is a
candidate c{x,y} ∈ Cx ∩ Cy and hence Cx ∩ Cy 6= ∅, contradicting the fact that Vi is 1-layered.
This completes the proof.
6 The Price of Diversity
Typically committees that maximize f are not D-diverse and, so, we sometimes need to “pay
a price” for diversity,5 which can be expressed as the ratio between f of the overall optimal
committee and f of the optimal D-diverse committee.
Definition 24. Let K = {W ⊆ C : |C| = k} and KD = {W ∈ K : W isD-diverse}. The
5This notion of “paying a price” should not be taken literally. In many settings maintaining diversity leads to
obtaining better societal outcomes because many aspects of elected committees are not captured by the objective
function. Here we are concerned with the loss of the value of the objective function, but see it purely as a technical
concept.
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price of diversity of D subject to f is defined as
pod(f,D) =
maxW∈K f(W )
maxW∈KD f(W )
.
In general, the price of diversity can be unbounded, since the diversity requirement can force
a committee W with minimum objective value. For specific diversity specifications, however,
one can bound the price of diversity.
Theorem 25. Given a BALANCED-COMMITTEE instance and a submodular objective function
f , the price of diversity is at most 2.
Proof. Let O∗ = argmaxW∈Kf(W ). Without loss of generality assume that |O
∗ ∩ A| ≥ k′.
Choose W1 ⊆ O
∗ ∩ A such that |W1| = k
′ and f(W1) is maximal. Since f is submodular, we
have f(O∗) ≤ f(W1)+f(O
∗\W1) and, by monotonicity, f(W1) ≥
1
2
·f(O∗). We conclude that
for any committeeW that containsW1 we have f(W ) ≥
1
2
· f(O∗). Since there are D-diverse
committees that containW1, we have pod(f,D) ≤ 2.
In general, we can expect a bounded price of diversity only if either the diversity require-
ments are not very restrictive (as it is the case with balanced committees) or if preferences are to
some degree aligned with the constraints. A more detailed study of the price of diversity would
be a very interesting research direction.
7 Related Work
Our work touches upon many concepts and, thus, is related to many pieces of research. In this
section we briefly mention some of the most relevant ones.
Lang and Skowron (2016) considered a model of diversity requirements that closely re-
sembles our interval constraints. There are two main differences between their work and ours:
(i) they do not consider objective functions and (ii) their input consists of “ideal points” instead
of intervals for each label; since there might not exist a committee satisfying such “exact” con-
straints, they focus on finding committees minimizing a certain distance to the ideal diversity
distributions.
If the labels denote party affiliations of the candidates, the diversity constraints are one-
layered and form instances for the apportionment problem, where seats in the parliament should
be distributed among the parties (see the book of Balinski and Young (1982) for an overview
of the apportionment problems). Bi-apportionment (Balinski and Demange, 1989a,b) can be
viewed as an extension of the traditional apportionment to the case when the diversity con-
straints are two-layered. However, in all these settings there is no objective functions, and the
goal is only to find a committee satisfying certain label-based constraints. For this reason our
paper is even closer the work of Brams (1990), who introduces a specific method based on
approval voting that takes diversity constraints into account, which are expressed as quotas for
each possible tuple of labels; Potthoff (1990) and Straszak et al. (1993) formulated an ILP for
this method.
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Optimization of a given objective functions due to constraints is a classic problem stud-
ied extensively in the literature. For a review of this literature we refer the reader to the book
of Korte and Vygen (2006). More specifically, Krause and Golovin (2012) provide a com-
prehensive survey for the case when the optimized function is submodular. For submodular
functions different types of general constraints are considered, including matroid and knapsack
constraints (Chekuri, Vondrk, and Zenklusen, 2014). A particularly related case is when the
constraints are given for the size of the committee (see e.g., the works of Qian et al. (2017)
and the references inside)—interestingly, this case can be represented in our model, when we
assume that there is a single label assigned to each candidate, and the constraints are given for
the number of occurrences of this label in the elected committee. Candidates having positive
synergies may induce supermodular (instead of submodular) objective functions. We note that
constrained maximization of a supermodular function is equivalent to constrained minimization
of a submodular function, known to be NP-hard (Iwata and Nagano, 2009).
Our model is related to the Multidimensional Knapsack problem with submodular objective
functions (Fre´ville, 2004; Sviridenko, 2004; Lee et al., 2009; Florios, Mavrotas, and Diakoulaki,
2010; Puchinger, Raidl, and Pferschy, 2010; Kulik, Shachnai, and Tamir, 2013), but differs in
a few important aspects. The two biggest differences are: (i) Multidimensional Knapsack has
constraints of the form “no more than value D on dimension i” (dimensions correspond to
labels in our work), whereas our constraints can have more structure (specific quantities of a
given label, or upper and lower bounds), (ii) Multidimensional Knapsack has items that can
contribute more than a unit weight to a particular dimension, whereas our candidates only have
0/1 contributions. Thus, our problem is more general regarding the constraint specification, but
less general regarding the structure of the weights of items.
The complexity of selecting an optimal committee without constraints has been studied
extensively. For a general overview of this literature, we point the reader to a chapter by Fal-
iszewski et al. (2017). Perhaps the most attention was dedicated to the study of the Chamberlin–
Courant rule (Chamberlin and Courant, 1983). For instance, it is known that this rule is NP-
hard to compute (Procaccia, Rosenschein, and Zohar, 2008). The problem of finding a winning
Chamberlin–Courant committee under restricted domains of voters’ preferences was further
studied by Betzler, Slinko, and Uhlmann (2013), Yu, Chan, and Elkind (2013), Elkind and Lack-
ner (2015), Skowron et al. (2015), and Peters and Lackner (2017). Parametrized complexity of
the problem was studied by Betzler, Slinko, and Uhlmann (2013) and its approximability by Lu
and Boutilier (2011), Skowron, Faliszewski, and Slinko (2015) and Skowron and Faliszewski
(2015).
Finally, we note that Celis, Huang, and Vishnoi (2017) very recently and independently
introduced a model for diversity constraints (in their paper refered to as fairness constraints)
that is similar to our model. Their paper contains algorithmic results, which are also applicable
in our setting.
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Label Interval Independent
Rule Structure Constraints Constraints
separable 1-laminar P P
2-laminar P NP-hard
3-layer NP-hard NP-hard
few labels FPT W[1]-hard
submodular 1-laminar 0.5-approx. ?
balanced 0.63-approx. —
CC balanced PTAS —
Table 1: The complexity of computing winning committees for rules of a given type, for the case of
candidates with particular label structures, and particular diversity specifications. The complexity results
for the problem of testing if a feasible committee exists are the same as those for computing winning
committees. “Balanced” label structure refers to the problem of computing balanced committees (thus
the case of independent constraints is not defined for this setting).
8 Conclusion
We studied the problem of selecting a committee of a given size that, on the one hand, would
be diverse (according to a given diversity specification) and, on the other hand, would obtain
as high an objective value as possible. We present our results in Table 1. We find that in gen-
eral our problem is computationally hard, but there are many tractable special cases, especially
for separable objective functions (which are very useful for shortlisting tasks, where diversity
constraints are particularly relevant) and for up to 2-laminar label structures (which means that
dealing with two sets of independent, hierarchically arranged labels, is feasible). Our work leads
to many open problems. In particular, we barely scratched the surface regarding approximation
of our problems, or their parametrized complexity. Experimental studies would be very desir-
able as well.
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